You are given the following best-response functions for duopoly firms playing a bertrand price-setting game: p 1 equals 25 plus 0.5 m 1 plus 0.25 p 2, and p 2 equals 25 plus 0.5 m 2 plus 0.25 p 1, where m 1 and m 2 are the marginal costs for firm 1 and firm 2 respectively. let m 1 equals m 2 equals $ 10. solve for the bertrand equilibrium prices. firm 1 $ nothing (round answers to the nearest penny) firm 2 $ nothing (round answers to the nearest penny)

1. 'Are you deaf?' asked Tom. Tom asked Jo if she was deaf.

2.'Have you learned your sign language?' asked Lisa. Lisa asked Dan if he did learn sign language.

3.' Where did you see the deaf orchestra?' asked Fiona. Fiona asked Graham where did he see the deaf orchestra.

4.'put your glasses on,' said Tim. Tim told Harry to put his glasses on.

5.'How can you read in the dark?' asked David. David asked Claire how can she read in the dark.

6.'Don't shout at me!' said Britney. Britney told Hugh to not shout at her.

Explanation: